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RACIAL CARTELS AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
ENFORCEMENT POWER
Darrell A.H. Miller
INTRODUCTION
n the summer and winter of 1865, a moderately successful Boston
novelist and newspaperman named John Townsend Trowbridge toured
the South. The Civil War had ended, but the South still smoldered-
figuratively, if not literally. On a steam-boat trip, Trowbridge came across
an embittered Alabama planter who explained what he expected would
happen once the federal government stopped its Reconstruction efforts:
[Tihings will work back again into their old grooves. The nigger is
going to be made a serf, sure as you live. It won't need any law for that.
Planters will have an understanding among themselves: 'You won't hire
my niggers, and I won't hire yours;' then what's left for them? They're
attached to the soil, and we're as much their masters as ever. I'll stake
my life, this is the way it will work.'
The entire Reconstruction project can be understood as an effort to
prevent things from "work[ing] back again into their old grooves"-at least
as this planter predicted.
The grooves of racialized caste are ancient and they are deep. So deep,
in fact, that the people who fall into them scarcely know they are in a rut.3
Instead, they appear to the unreflective person as a well-worn path, a
shortcut, a trail through an otherwise incomprehensible wilderness of data.4
! Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. This essay is
based on remarks made on a panel at the conference titled Structural Racism: Inequality
in America Today, hosted by the University of Kentucky College of Law in February 2011.
This essay is an elaboration on themes I have touched upon in my previous work on the
Thirteenth Amendment, including Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of
r866, and the History ofJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Miller, White Cartels] and Darrell A.H. Miller, A Thirteenth Amendment Agenda for the Twenty-
first Century: Of Promises, Power and Precaution, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (Alex Tsesis ed., 2OLo) [herein-
after Miller, A Thirteenth Amendment Agenda]. Thanks to Peter Carstensen and Emily Houh for
their comments on this project. All errors remain my own.
2 J. T. T OWBRIDGE, THE SOUTH: A TOUR OF ITS BATTLE-FIELDS AND RUINED CITIES, A
JOURNEY THROUGH THE DESOLATED STATES, AND TALKS WITH THE PEOPLE 427 (Hartford, L.
Stebbins 1866).
3 See infra Part I.A.
4 See GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 17 (2002) (noting that "race"
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The literature on discrimination and racism is vast and vibrant.' This
essay cannot hope to match the theoretical work of these scholars. Instead,
this piece has three more modest goals. First, relying on the work of Ian
Haney L6pez, among others, it surveys the existing theoretical explanations
for structural racism, with particular emphasis on structural racism as the
product of both unconscious conventions and invisible framing devices -
what Haney L6pez calls "institutions." Second, it aims to tie this idea of
institutions with the work of Daria Roithmayr, Richard McAdams, and other
scholars who identify racial discrimination as a type of cartel behavior. In
particular, this essay ties these theories together by positing that the "glue"
that holds racial cartels together in the modern era is often the product of
tacit understandings, behavioral norms, and invisible framing devices that
can nonetheless create the same type of detrimental social and economic
effects for minorities that collusive cartel behavior produces.
Once I have outlined the framework for discussing structural racism, this
essay turns to the third, more overtly legal point. What does the existence of
institutions that lead to cartel-like results mean about modern government
power to guide and keep the nation out of its rut? In answer, I turn to an
often-mentioned, but under-theorized, legal resource-the Thirteenth
Amendment. In particular, I will provide an account of how Congress,
through its Section Two authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, is
empowered to break these racialized cartels and to prevent their formation
through "appropriate legislation." For if the structural racism in America
can be traced back to aggregations of individual and private habits of
mind and behavior - institutions - that related to maintaining slavery in
the past, then we can discern in the Thirteenth Amendment the authority
for government to fashion tools to change those institutions both in the
present and in the future.
I. STRUCTURAL RACISM
A. Theories of Racial Discrimination
Theories of racial discrimination take a number of forms and have taken
up thousands of pages.6At the risk of over-simplifying an extremely complex
is descriptive of a manner that humans categorize and group information "to navigate their
way through a murky, uncertain social world").
5 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 197 1); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS]; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
6 For much of this taxonomy, I am indebted to the work of Ian Haney L6pez. See Ian F
Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination,
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and overlapping literature, the theories can be summarized as follows: First,
there is the rational, intentional discriminator model. This is the economic
argument that racial discrimination is, in fact, intentional (that is conscious)
and rational (it actually maximizes the discriminator's interests).7 Second,
there is the intentional, irrational discriminator model. This model also
assumes that discrimination is intentional (that is conscious), but argues
that it is irrational (it does not maximize the discriminator's interests).
These two models' shared assumption is intentionality; the discriminator
knows and intends to discriminate.8
Intentional discrimination theories tend to center around questions of
whether engaging in discrimination is, in fact, rational (interest maximizing),
rather than around questions of whether it is intentional. For example,
one way of describing the rationality of discrimination is that individuals
assign a certain utility to indulging their "taste" for discrimination.9
Under this model, for example, an employer's indulgence in a taste for
racial discrimination (or catering to the taste for racial discrimination of
the employer's customers or employees) is irrational because it fails to
maximize that employer's material outcomes. Employers without a taste
for discrimination will prosper at the expense those that do. Eventually,
those that have a taste for discrimination will be squeezed out of the
marketplace.1°
Alternatively, some scholars argue that the discriminator's indulgence
in a taste for discrimination is rational in the sense that the person's loss
of pecuniary or material benefit is exceeded by the gain in personal utility
to the individual by either indulging in the taste, or by catering to the
discriminatory tastes of others." Another version of this theory is that
racial discrimination is rational because racial characteristics are actually
predictive of some trait or characteristic the discriminator wants to select
109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
7 Id. at 1762 (noting one theory of racial discrimination that assumes that it is an efficient
way of selecting for traits that are otherwise more difficult to assess).
8 Id. at 1761.
9 This theory was first advanced by Gary Becker. See BECKER, supra note 5, at 14-15 (cre-
ating economic model for calculating costs of tastes for discrimination).
Io See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination
in Labor Markets, 53 U. CM. L. REv. 891, 912 (1986) (noting such competitive disadvantage in
labor markets).
I i See Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination. Economic Theory,
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237, 250-51 (1996) (not-
ing scholars who argue that "[tlhe taste discriminator will remain as long as he is willing to
pay for the inefficiency created by his behavior"); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1622
(I990) (noting that an employer will incur a cost for not discriminating, whether the taste for
discrimination is the employer's own taste, or the taste of the employer's customers or agents).
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for or against. I"
Richard McAdams offers a third, powerful and nuanced variation on
this theme of the rational discriminator."3 He argues that the intentional
discriminator does not necessarily expect to see a, direct personal benefit
from discrimination. Instead, racial discrimination is a way to maximize
the "group status" benefits of the group to which that discriminator
belongs (or perhaps seeks to belong). The benefits to the discriminator
come indirectly, by enhancing the esteem of the traits the discriminator
shares with this group. The discriminator does this by degrading the traits
of members of outsiders. 14 Whether the individual discriminator makes a
conscious decision based on the fact that his specific discriminatory act will
contribute to elevation of group status is not clear according to McAdams. 5
Under these three models, the intentional rational discriminator, or
the intentional, irrational discriminator, or the group status-enhancing
discriminator, it is largely presumed that "(1) [a]ctors know their interests;
(2) actors consciously weigh alternative means of maximizing their interests;
and (3) actors act to maximize their interests."'' 6
Finally, there is a fourth, more controversial model of discrimination
articulated by Haney L6pez among others. This theory rejects the conscious
discriminator model, whether such model is rational or irrational. Instead,
this model posits that discriminatory behaviors are not--or are no longer-
motivated by conscious, intentional action, but are simply the effects of
behavioral or cognitive inertia. Under this theory of racism, conscious
intent, the fundamental assumption of the intentional, rational actor, is
significantly reduced. 7 As Haney L6pez describes them, institutional
models of racism arise from either decisions made as a result of "stock
prescriptions of conventional action, in which action stems from ingrained
1z See Jacob E. Gersen, Markets and Discrimination, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 689, 699 (2007)
(observing that discrimination for a trait may be economically rational and persistent to the
extent it is accurate). I will assume for purposes of this piece the observation made by other
scholars, that "even if the stereotype is descriptively 'accurate,' it is normatively wrong to treat
individuals differently on the basis of that stereotype in many contexts." Jerry Kang & Kristin
Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: ImplicitBias andtheLaw, 58 UCLA L. REv. 465,518 (20 10).
13 Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production
and Race Discrimination, Io8 HARv. L. REV. 1003 (1995); see also Haney L6pez, supra note 6, at
1764-69 (discussing McAdams's theory).
14 McAdams, supra note 13, at 1045 (observing that one way of enhancing the status of
one's current traits is "by lowering the status accorded the traits of others").
i5 See Haney L6pez, supra note 6, at 1766 (noting that McAdams "acknowledg[esl that
few if any actors proceed from a conscious interest in esteem"); see also McAdams, supra note
13, at io6o (observing that "[wihen one seeks to gain status by lowering the status of others,"
the strategy must by necessity deny that conscious denigration is taking place).
16 Haney L6pez, supra note 6, at 1761. I am not as certain as Professor Haney L6pez that
McAdams's theory can be categorized appropriately as a theory of conscious rational action,
but I will assume the characterization for purposes of this essay.
17 Id. at 1781-82.
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habits and responses with virtually no conscious thought"' 5 -what he
calls "scripts"-or from conventional knowledge that "prescribes not the
specifics of action[,] but its boundaries, channeling actors along certain
courses" of action 19 -what he calls "paths"-or both.2 0
In this fourth model of discrimination, intent has little to do with the
persistence of racism. Discriminators are not consciously maximizing
their interests, whether those interests are defined as maximum material
benefit, as indulging in a personal taste for discrimination, or as enhancing
group status. Neither are the discriminators accurately making predictions
based on physical characteristics. In Haney L6pez's model, discriminators
rarely behave consciously at all. Discriminators simply follow racialized
conventions of behavior that have been laid down generations before, or
make decisions within a "choice architecture,""' whose racialized nature is
invisible or has long been forgotten."2
B. Cartels, Reconstruction, and the Institutional Ties That Bind
1. The Nature of Cartels.-These theories of racial discrimination are
illuminating when considered alongside models of racial discrimination
based on cartel behavior. As antitrust scholars know, "the primary goal of
antitrust policy is to penalize cartels and to inhibit their formation." 3 As
discussed more fully in Part II below, policies against racial subjugation can
be articulated in a similar way, that their primary goal is the inhibition or
punishment of racialized cartels.
The classic economic cartel consists of an agreement between
competitors in restraint of trade. A variant of the shop-worn hypothetical
is the two gas-station owners who meet in the middle of the highway and
agree to set prices.2 4 There is an agreement, it is in restraint of trade, and
18 Id. at 1781.
19 Id. at 1782.
2o Id. (noting that these two theories may operate together).
21 RICHARD H. TIALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (zoo8) (coining this term and describing a "choice archi-
tect" as one with "the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make deci-
sions").
22 Or, as Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "A very common phenomenon, and one very
familiar to the student of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time
establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disap-
pears, but the rule remains." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., T"E COMMON LAW 5 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
23 William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 4o8
(2007).
24 For one such use of this often-used hypothetical, see Daniel J. Chepaitis, The National
Labor Relations Act, Non-Paralleled Competition, andMarket Power, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 769,777-78
(1997).
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it inures to the benefit of the cartel members."5 In fact, cartels of the early
antitrust era were actually written agreements between competitors that
set terms for the collusion and punishments for breach.26
But antitrust scholars recognize that not all agreements in restraint of
trade need to be express. "Conscious parallelism," the tacit understanding
among competitors to coordinate action,27 can also give rise to cartel-like
effects."8 Even though conscious parallelism standing alone has proven
insufficient to sustain federal antitrust enforcement, 9 it still has powerful
explanatory force in the area of anticompetitive theory. As one scholar
recognizes, "conscious parallelism ... can be just as effective as an explicit
price-fixing cartel at suppressing output and increasing price."30 Judges
require some evidence of agreement, "not so much because [judges]
believe that there is any significant economic difference in the effect of
the two practices, but because agreeing to suppress competition can be
identified as a 'bad act' while merely following business instincts cannot."'"
As discussed below, this idea of intentionality motivates the analysis behind
25 See Diria Roithmayr, RacialCartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45,50 (201o) (defining a car-
tel as "a group of actors who work together [through informal or formal agreements] to extract
monopoly profits by limiting competition and restricting supply"); see also Page, supra note 23,
at 4o8 ("[R]estraints of trade like coordinated pricing are only illegal under section I [of the
Sherman Antitrust Act] if they are the product of an agreement.").
26 See Page, supra note 23, at 410; see also United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 296 (1897) (detailing an agreement between rail lines that included investigatory
and penalty provisions).
27 As one scholar put it, the "hallmark [of conscious parallelism] is the absence of agree-
ment.... A cartel is not set up explicitly; instead, firms establish parallel conduct understand-
ing the accomplishment of a common purpose."' Reza Dibadj, Conscious Parallelism Revisited,
47 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 589,596 (2OLO) (quoting Hans-Theo Normann, Conscious Parallelism in
Asymmetric Oligopoly, 51 METROECONOM ICA 343, 343 (2000)).
z8 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008).
29 Id.; see also Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954) ("[Tlhis Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively es-
tablishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act
offense."). Until recently, evidence of conscious parallelism could be circumstantial evidence
of an agreement, leading to further discovery past the motion to dismiss stage. Whether that
survives after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is another matter. See Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 444, 556-57 (2oo8) (stating that "without more, parallel conduct does not suggest
conspiracy" sufficient to get past the pleading stage); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 618 E3d 300, 324 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that a plaintiff relying on evidence of
parallel behavior alone must state facts that "raise[] a suggestion of a preceding agreement,
not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
30 Crane, supra note 28, at 30.
31 Id. at 30-31; see also Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1575 (1969) [hereinafter Posner, Oligopoly] ("The purpose of
section I [of the Sherman Antitrust Act] is to deter collusion by increasing its costs; this sug-
gests that the tacit colluder should be punished like the express colluder.").
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race discrimination law as well.3"
Classical economic theories presume that cartels, whether maintained by
actual or tacit agreement, will inevitably collapse because of the defection
problem. Cartel members are enticed by the lure of competitive advantage.
These classical theories posit that, whenever possible, cartel members will
defect or "cheat" by changing prices, outputs, or hiring.3 3 For this reason,
according to these theories, cartels must be maintained by government
sanction, threat of extra-legal violence, or some combination of both.
34
Some theorists of racial discrimination as cartel behavior incorporate
these classical economic assumptions. They assume that discriminators
act consciously and with an assessment of the costs and benefits of any
course of action. The discriminator takes into consideration the threat
of legal sanction for defecting from the cartel, the risk of extra-legal
violence for defection, and the rewards versus the risks that come from
defection. In each case, the decision whether to stick with the cartel or to
defect is conscious and rational. The effect of legal sanction, government
enforcement, or extra-legal violence is simply one additional data point
that goes into the calculation. According to these classic economic models,
the cartel ultimately will dissolve in the absence of extra-legal violence or
government enforcement because everyone will determine that it is in his
or her best interest not to discriminate.35
Recent scholarship on cartels casts some doubt on these lassiez-faire
accounts of cartel stability. It appears that other types of cartel discipline
are possible and effective, quite apart from official government sanction
or threats of violence. For example, private dispute resolution procedures,
personal or family relationships between cartel members, the creation
of behavioral norms within the cartel, and the formation of a "group
32 See infra Part I.B.z.
33 Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM.
& MARy L. REV. 1621, 1629-30 (2008); Page, supra note 23, at 413.
34 Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why Antidiscrimination Laws are
Still a Mistake, io8 HARV. L. REv. 1o85, 1100-05 (1995) (suggesting race-based cartels in the
South could not exist but for violence); see also Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203,
222-23 (1942) ("Some private trusts and cartels ... [impose] scarcity by violence, sometimes
privately through their police, sometimes indirectly through the armed forces of the govern-
ments which they dominate....").
35 See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527,
1531 (zoi I) ("The Chicago School's neoclassical economic theories teach that irrationality is
irrelevant to antitrust doctrine: rational firms eliminate irrationality from the marketplace.");
see also EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 5, at 41-47 (arguing that the racial cartels
will crumble); David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on
Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76'TEx. L. REV. 781, 825 (1998) ("[l~t is very difficult
for a cartel, including a cartel of racist whites, to operate effectively unless the government
intervenes on its behalf."). For more on the manner in whichr acial cartels form and enforce
discipline, see Roithmayr, supra note z5, at 55-65.
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identity" can all act to increase cartel cohesion and reduce defection.36
Christopher Leslie, for instance, identifies an antebellum salt cartel that
imposed "shunning" punishments upon defectors.37 Or, as Richard Posner
has written in the context of medieval guilds, a set of identity, familial,
and professional norms can act to enforce cartel discipline.38 Once these
informal and insular norms are established, cartels can become difficult to
discover and to break.3 9
Furthermore, these informal tools of cartel discipline may not appear
to the cartel member as either coercive or wrong ° -in fact, they may not
register to the cartel member as discipline at all. Instead, they become
simply, as a cartel member might say, "the way we do things."' 4' These
norms can actually come to be viewed within the cartel as a positive,
or as a moral imperative. As Richard Posner suggests, some cartels are
kept together by bonds of "tradition," "pride," "loyalty to the guild," and
"equality among guild members..' '4 Eventually, the cartel becomes "a social
as well as a business alliance." 43 Or, to relate it back to Haney L6pez's work,
the norms of behavior and the structures of choice that hold together the
cartel are invisible-they are a type of identity, a "script," or alternatively,
they form the "boundaries" of what is conceivable, what is possible, what
is morally acceptable. 44
That these scripts or paths become invisible, or part of the "normative
36 See Leslie, supra note 33, at 1630 (discussing mechanisms by which economic car-
tels police their members); see also Page, supra note 23, at 410 (observing that "loose-knit"
"gentlemen's" agreements were target of antitrust legislation); Roithmayr, RacialCartels, supra
note 25, at 51 (identifying theories that suggest "that social norms are an effective way to
police cartel members"). For a more extended discussion of the stability of cartels using these
methods, see Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 8z 'Tx. L. REv. 515 (2004)
[hereinafter Leslie, Distrust andAntitrust].
37 Leslie, supra note 33, at 1673-77.
38 Richard Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 10 ( 993) [hereinafter
Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence].
39 See Leslie, supra note 33, at 1634; see also Peter C. Carstensen, While Antitrust Was Out
to Lunch: Lessons from the i98os for the Next Century of Enforcement, SMU L. REv. 1881, 1 889-92
(1995) (discussing the work of Robert Axelrod to demonstrate how tacit collusion among com-
petitors can be stable over time).
40 Leslie observes that "[a] social norm that belittles antitrust principles can become so
pervasive that executives may fail to give any weight to the fact that antitrust violations are
illegal." Leslie, supra note 33, at 1674-75.
41 Leslie, Distrust and Antitrust, supra note 36, at 585-90 (discussing how cartels create
trust by developing social norms of cooperation and associations to perpetuate those social
norms).
42 Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, supra note 38, at Io (emphasis added). For
more on the relationship between guilds and cartel behavior see McAdams, supra note 13, at
1059.
43 Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, supra note 38, at Io.
44 See Haney L6pez, supra note 6, at 1819-zo; see also Roithmayr, supra note 25, at 6o-62
(discussing "internalized norms" as a method of cartel discipline).
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universe '4 in which we operate, makes the process of norm generation
in combating cartel behavior all the more essential. As scholars have
noted in the area of purely economic cartels, the process of developing
informal norms against price fixing and anticompetitive conduct within
firms, in addition to existing criminal and civil sanctions, can help deter
cartel formation. 4 A similar type of norm creation and maintenance can be
applied to racial cartels.
2. Reconstruction History and Racial Cartels.-Cartels as an economic model
help explain racial discrimination's rise and persistence. I do not want to
overstate the case. Not all aspects of antitrust theory or cartel behavior
are directly translatable to the phenomenon of racial discrimination.47
For example, there is disagreement as to the object of protection in these
two types of analyses. In antitrust, the assumption, at least among some
scholars, is that the law is designed to protect the consumer. Cartelization
is prohibited because it tends to diminish competition and thereby harm
consumers.4" According to this view, economic decisions that actually
benefit the consumer are not the target of traditional antitrust.49 In
antidiscrimination law, it is presumed that racial discrimination is itself
a form of harm. The discrimination is experienced by the object of the
harm, and without respect to whether some hypothetical consumer, or
even all consumers, are better or worse off due to the discrimination.
Notwithstanding, understanding racism as a type of cartel behavior does
help bridge disparate economic, behavioral and legal theories that, until
recently, have tended to remain isolated. As Ian Ayres has suggested, the
same equality norms "undergird[] the social concern with both civil rights
and antitrust discrimination.""s Whether African-Americans in particular
are locked out of opportunity by governments or aggregates of private
45 See Robert M. Cover, Nomos & Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 4 (i983) (coining the
phrase "normative universe").
46 Reeves & Stucke, supra note 35, at 1569-70.
47 See Miller, White Cartels, supra note I, at 1045 & n.331 (making a similar disclaimer).
48 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 487 (1977) ("The antitrust
laws ... were enacted for 'the protection of competition not competitors."' (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,320 (1962)).
49 This view of the purpose of antitrust is subject to vigorous debate among antitrust
scholars. See Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 133, 138 (2011) (discussing debate in antitrust circles about whether antitrust protec-
tion extends to both buyers and sellers in a market); see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert
H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Effiieny, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 19t, 196 (2008) (arguing that antitrust is designed to protect all consum-
ers, not just end users). My purpose is not to take sides in this debate, but simply to show that
the different goals of antitrust and antidiscrimination must be respected.
50 Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing
When Disparate Impacts are Unjustified, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 679 (2007).
20II-2012]
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citizens, and whether the motivation for the lock out is conscious or not,
the results are the same.51 It also gives some analytical coherence to both
the power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment, and the doctrine
that has built around its implementation in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
It is apparent from the historical record that racialized restraints of trade,
buttressed by government sanction and threat of violence, were among the
initial strategies of Southern planters in the first few years of Reconstruction.
Shortly following emancipation, planters engaged in express concerted
action to control the labor force and to reduce the value of the freedman's
power. They "often effected combinations or understandings among
themselves not to contract with any former slave who failed to produce
a 'consent paper' or proper discharge from his previous owner.""2 Planters
conspired together to draft model agreements, fix wages, set standard
penalties for breach of labor contracts, and restrict freedmen's ownership
of real property.53 Freedmen's Bureau agents sometimes broke up these
combinations, but sometimes "[chose] to look the other way" when the
cartels accomplished the Bureau's goal of maintaining labor stability.54 Even
if federal agents broke up the combinations, "planters kept themselves
informed of what their neighbors were paying and paid no more,"55 creating
a similar kind of tacit or "conscious parallel" activity that has been the
subject of traditional antitrust scholarship. 6
White southerners also enlisted local and state positive law-in the form
of the Black Codes-to keep cartel members in line. The Black Codes, as
Eric Foner describes them, were a comprehensive attempt to regulate labor,
property, taxation, justice, and education of the freedmen in such a way as
"to put the state much in the place of the former master."5 " In some of these
provisions, freedmen were constrained by law as to what occupations they
could hold, restricted as to where they could rent property, and punished
51 This is a fact that Justice Douglas seemed to appreciate. In the words of James Boyd
White, Justice Douglas recognized that "when one group ... ha[s] such a practical monopoly
of private and public power that they may simply choose whether to achieve their objectives
through the arms of the state or through concerted private action, it ought not matter which
form of power they elect to use." James Boyd White, What's Wrong With Our Talk About Race?
On History, Particulariy, andAffirmative Action, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 1927, 1946 (2002).
52 LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: TE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 415
(1979).
53 Id. at 415-16 (identifying each of these strategies).
54 Id. at416.
55 Id.
56 See Crane, supra note z8, at 3o; Page, supra note 23, at 41o; Posner, Oligopoly, supra note
3 I1, at 1575-76-
57 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 198
(1988) (quoting WILLIAM WATSON DAVIS, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA 425
(Faculty of Political Sci. of Columbia Univ. eds., 1913)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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for vagrancy if they did not have employment."8 A Florida law criminalized
insubordination.59 "Antienticement" laws enforced the planter cartel by
criminalizing defectors who would offer better terms to a freedman for his
or her labor.6" In addition, southerners solely or in the aggregate resorted to
violence.61 Freedmen were physically assaulted or harmed; white defectors
from the cartel were punished by other whites.
Unquestionably, positive law and extra-legal violence helped enforce
cartel discipline. But that is only part of the story. It is also apparent that
racialized social norms, and the racialized framing for how choices are
made and discretion exercised, also kept together the structures of the
old slave system. As Haney L6pez defines it, "[a] racial institution is
any understanding of race that has come to be so widely shared within
a community that it operates as an unexamined cognitive resource for
understanding one's self, others, and the-way-the-world-is."62
Racial institutions functioned even in the absence of positive law
and violence to keep together the unity of racial cartels in the South.
For example, it was widely believed that African-Americans were lazy or
unwilling to work. This stereotype justified slavery in the first instance and
persisted during Reconstruction. In a remarkable example of confirmation
bias, Carl Schurz noted that:
By a large majority of those [whites] I came in contact with ... every
irregularity that occurred was directly charged against the system of free
labor. If negroes walked away from the plantations, it was conclusive
proof of the incorrigible instability of the negro, and the impracticability
of free negro labor. If some individual negroes violated the terms of their
contract, it proved unanswerably that no negro had, or ever would have,
a just conception of the binding force of a contract, and that this system
of free negro labor was bound to be a failure. If some negroes shirked,
or did not perform their task with sufficient alacrity, it was produced
as irrefutable evidence to show that physical compulsion was actually
indispensable to make the negro work. If negroes, idlers or refugees
crawling about the towns, applied to the authorities for subsistence,
it was quoted as incontestably establishing the point that the negro
was too improvident to take care of himself, and must necessarily be
consigned to the care of a master.'
58 Id. at 2oo.
59 Id.
6o Id. For more on this point, see Bernstein, supra note 35, at 790-91, and Roithmayr,
supra note 25, at 57.
6I LITWACK, supra note 52, at 416 (noting that "[iun some regions, patrols of white men
meted out summary justice to blacks who were not under contract to an employer or who were
found to be in violation of a contract").
62 Haney L6pez, supra note 6, at I8o8.
63 CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH (1865), reprinted in I
SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 310 (Frederic Bancroft
ed., The Knickerbocker Press 1913) [hereinafter Schurz, REPORT ON THE CONDITION]; see also
Reeves & Stucke, supra note 35, at 1533 (citing behavioral theories that recognize that people
"give undue weight to evidence that supports our beliefs, while discounting evidence that
undercuts our beliefs").
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This shared "understanding" of African-Americans led to official
vagrancy laws, but also to a set of assumptions about how labor contracts
needed to be drafted and enforced, how to oversee work that needed to
be done, and how to administer otherwise neutral laws, such as breach of
contract.
The delegation of law enforcement obligations to private citizens was
another example of racism becoming institutionalized. During slavery the
law often deliberately enlisted the power of private citizens to accomplish
its goals. Private parties were legally forbidden from interfering with the
slave catching and kidnapping activities of private citizens, and were
compelled to assist in such slave catching if called upon by government
officials, 64
A similar type of enforcement through private parties continued into
Reconstruction. This time, however, the effort was not in express service of
slavery, but in service of defending the community against "vagrants." In the
early days of Reconstruction, any white person was permitted to question
the employment status of any black person. If a black man or woman had
no work, the private citizen was empowered to arrest the freedman as a
vagrant. 6 Schurz noted that by deputizing all citizens to enforce the law,
the Southern states had all but relegated African-Americans to life "under
a sort of permanent martial law."66 Justice Samuel Miller wrote a letter in
1866 with similar sentiments: "[a]s it was, the individual slave ... [labored]
for the individual white man. As it is proposed to be, the whole body of the
negro race in each state, must belong to and [labor] for the whole body
of the white people of that state .... -61 Even when the language of the
vagrancy statutes was race-neutral to comply with the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, the understanding among the private enforcers was that African-
Americans were the proper targets.68
64 SeeJack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 18oi, 1838-4o (2010).
65 SCHuRz, REPORT ON THE CONDITION, supra note 63, at 326 (noting provisions that "in-
vest[] every white man with the power and authority of a police officer as against every black
man").
66 Id.
67 CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 129
(2d prtg. 2004) (1939). Unfortunately, this sentiment did not extend to Justice Miller's think-
ing when it came to discrimination without compulsion of law, but as the consequence of ag-
gregated private preferences or notions of property rights. Justice Miller joined the majority in
the Civil Rights Cases. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (finding that public ac-
commodation laws could not be supported 'by Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power).
68 See Miller, White Cartels, supra note I, at 103o n.231.
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II. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT POWER AND RACIAL CARTELS
Give me the power to cut up slavery, root and branch, wherever the
federal authority legitimately extends, and I will open veins enough to
bleed the monster to death. Breathe into our national life a sentiment
strong enough to ripen into such legislation, and the backbone of the
slave power will be broken
9
So said the Quaker and Indiana Congressman George Washington Julian
in 1857. George Julian got what he wanted. As Lea VanderVelde writes, the
Thirteenth Amendment presumes an "end-state"; an America in which
slavery, that "agreement with hell,"70 is extirpated. 71 Radical Republicans
in the nineteenth century were certain in what they wanted; they wanted
slavery and everything associated with it eliminated.
72
The Thirteenth Amendment states: "1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation."73 Slavery as physical compulsion is
clearly contemplated by the text of the Amendment. But the Court has
stated that the power of Congress under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment extends beyond mere personal servitude. It also empowers
Congress with a power to legislate against the "badges" or "incidents,"7 4 or
even the "relic[s]" of slavery.75
To the extent that racial discrimination in the South can be understood
as a type of cartel behavior, supported by positive law and extra-legal
violence, it seems indisputable that Congress understood atleastthe first two
supports to be legitimate targets of Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
69 George Washington Julian, Speech Delivered at Raysville (July 4, 1857), in GEORGE
W. JULIAN, SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS 146 (New York, Hurd and Houghton 1872).
70 The quote is from William Lloyd Garrison in his denunciation of the Constitution as
a pro-slavery document. SANDFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 66 (1988) (quoting a
remark by Garrison in WALTER MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF Wm. LLOYD
GARRISON 205 (1963)).
71 Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855,
857 (2007).
72 Contemporaries of the Radical Republicans were much more circumspect as to
what the Thirteenth Amendment would achieve. For a discussion of the controversy over
the Thirteenth Amendment and its meaning, see MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE
CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
74 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
20 (1883).
75 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968) (finding that the refusal to
sell property to interracial couples, and thereby relegating them to racial "ghettos," could be
considered a relic of slavery). For criticism about the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
addressing "relics" of slavery, see Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges andIncidents of
Slavery, 14U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1666967.
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power. In 1866, for instance, Congress passed the first Civil Rights Act.
That Act provided that all citizens, of every race and color, should be able:
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, 'pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding 6
With the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Congress created federal guarantees
that would abrogate operation of the Black Codes, the positive law that had
supported the racial cartels of whites in the South. There has been little
question since the latter twentieth century that Congress possesses the
authority to use the Thirteenth Amendment in this fashion.77
In addition, passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act laid the foundation
to curtail the extra-legal violence that also supported these racialized
cartels. It empowered the federal government to prosecute "any person
who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory
to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act."78 Again,
today, there is little question of Congress's authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment to target extra-legal violence.79
It is the third leg of this stool, the societal norms, the scripts and paths
that were part of maintaining a slave culture,80 that form the fundamental
question about the power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment
in the twenty-first century. Put simply, does the ability of Congress to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on slavery and its badges
and incidents through "appropriate legislation" end at the stage in which
intentionality disappears, and classical economic theory predicts that
76 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Star. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1991)).
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (199I) (stating the Act applies to government and non-
government actors).
78 Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 2; see Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 427-30 (observing
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed under the Thirteenth Amendment, was aimed at
both state action and private actors). Butcf Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 722,
733 (1989) (recognizing that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as subsequently reenacted "is both
a Thirteenth and a Fourteenth Amendment statute" but holding that modern-day section
1983 is the exclusive remedy for damages actions against state officers acting under color of
state law).
79 See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105 ("Congress was wholly within its powers under s 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have
been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving
them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men.").
8o Cf. Balkin, supra note 64, at 1817 ("Slavery was not just legal ownership of people; it
was an entire system of conventions, understandings, practices, and institutions that conferred
power and social status and maintained economic and social dependency.").
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racialized cartels will disintegrate on their own? Or does the Thirteenth
Amendment also permit legislation that would prevent the creation of
these cartels as well?8' To date, the Court has consistently side-stepped
the direct question of whether the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement
power enables Congress to deal with disparate impacts created by private
choices, rather than disparate treatment."
History is illuminating, although seldom definitive. As Michael
Vorenberg has written, history cannot provide us with a "true" meaning
of the Thirteenth Amendment, as "Americans were left to work out the
origins and meanings of freedom long after the measure was adopted."83
It is difficult to discount the observations of the generation immediately
following the war, however. Those on the ground after the war quickly
appreciated that the Reconstruction Congress confronted not only a
political, but also a cultural challenge.
. Carl Schurz recognized this fact soon after surveying the condition of
the South. Schurz wrote that the "Itlhe principal cause" of the "rebellion"
was "that the Southern people cherished, cultivated, idolized their peculiar
interests and institutions in preference -to those which they had in common
with the rest of the American people."' This, to Schurz, explained "the
importance of the negro question as an integral part of the question
of union in general, and the question of reconstruction in particular."8
Whites in the South had come to regard "blacks [as] their property by
natural right"' and neither the war nor emancipation had loosened their
"ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the whites at large,
and whenever opportunity serves they treat the colored people just as
their profit, caprice or passion may dictate." '87 Schurz's diagnosis of the
medicine needed for success was bold and it was stark: "[I]t is not only the
political machinery of the States and their constitutional relations to the
81 See id. (noting that to truly "enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress must dis-
establish all the institutions, practices, and customs associated with slavery and make sure
they can never rise up again").
82 See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 n.17 (1982) ("We
need not decide whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself reaches practices with a dispro-
portionate effect as well as those motivated by discriminatory purpose, or indeed whether
it accomplished anything more than the abolition of slavery."); City of Memphis v. Greene,
451 U.S. 100, 125-29 (1981) (finding that closing a section of street did not violate enforce-
ment legislation under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment, and declining to find
Thirteenth Amendment Section One violation, but not deciding scope of Section Two pow-
er). For more on this topic, see William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, andthe Thirteenth Amendment:
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 13 11, 1328-29 (2007).
83 VORENBERG, supra note 72, at 3-4.
84 SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION, supra note 63, at 3o6.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 320 (quoting a letter from a commission of Freedmen's Bureau) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 Id.
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General Government, but the whole oiganism of Southern society that must be
reconstructed, or rather constructed anew, so as to bring it in harmony with
the rest of American society.
8 8
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 passed over the veto of President
Andrew Johnson, who believed-much like classical economists-that an
equilibrium between freedmen and their former masters would arise as
a natural product of market forces. 89 Freedmen organizations and Black
newspapers at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification also
seemed wary of relying too heavily on the simple operation of the free
market.90 After all, so many gradualist antebellum thinkers had assumed
that the invisible hand of the market would slowly strangle slavery and all
its incidents without the necessity for war or constitutional amendments.91
If one accepts that the project of the Thirteenth Amendment, in
fact all of Reconstruction, was to get at societal conventions themselves,
whether upheld by positive law, extra-legal violence, or neither, then this
has important implications for congressional power. Acts of individuals
and legislators that invidiously set apart African-Americans for disparate
treatment in a manner that has a slavery-era analog are clearly within the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment power. But Carl Schurz recognized
that something more revolutionary was required. The glue of convention,
of trust, of group identity that had held together the political, economic',
and social conventions of slavery in the South had to be denatured. 9
Under this reading of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power,
88 Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
89 As President Andrew Johnson said at the time of the veto, the Civil Rights Act of 1866
"frustrates" an adjustment that should be "left to the laws that regulate capital and labor." See
Miller, White Cartels, supra note I, at 1035-36 (quoting President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the
Civil Rights Act (Mar. 27, 1866), in PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: THE SPEECHES, PROCLAMATIONS,
AND POLICIES THAT HAVE SHAPED THE NATION FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 146, 149 (J.E
Watts & Fred L. Israel eds., 2000)).
90 VORENBERG, supra note 72, at 83 (noting that "African Americans, while embracing
much of free-labor ideology, rejected that strain of it that envisioned labor and capital working
out equitable arrangements organically, without government intervention").
91 As one delegate to the Constitutional Convention was reported to have said: "Let
us not intermeddle [with slavery]. As population increases poor laborers will be so plen-
ty as to render slaves useless. Slavery in time will not be a speck in our Country." JAMES
MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 444 (Gaillard Hunt et al. eds., 1920) (remarks of
Oliver Ellsworth); see also Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 190 (2004) (noting Framers' belief in gradual
death of slavery).
92 The fact that Southern whites with no property interest in slaves willingly enforced
slave-owners' economic interests is a powerful testament to this type of informal norms work-
ing in a cartel-like fashion. See Miller, White Cartels, supra note I, at IO28; see also Balkin, supra
note 64, at 1817 (suggesting that the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress "to dis-
mantle the interlocking social structures and status-enforcing practices that were identified
with slavery or that rationalized and perpetuated it").
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Reconstruction America equipped Congress with a powerful solvent.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Understanding the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power as a
power designed to destroy and to prevent racialized cartels has a number
of implications for current doctrine and future legislation. First, it offers
conceptual support for those cases in which the Court has extended the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the "badge or incident" of slavery concept
to non-African Americans punished for their affiliations with African-
Americans. For, if one purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement.
power is to disrupt the mechanisms that support racialized cartels, then it
seems reasonable that those persons who suffer for defection from these
cartels should have some right to recover under legislation passed pursuant
to the Thirteenth Amendment.
For example, retaliation claims by whites under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and its modern equivalents present a frequently unrecognized
problem of constitutional authority under Section Two of the Thirteenth
Amendment. If the Civil Rights Act of 1866 operates against private conduct
that Congress can rationally determine constitutes a "badge" or "incident"
of slavery, then how is it that a person who is not racially discriminated
against herself can have standing to sue for discrimination directed against
others? That is, if a white person asserts that she has been fired because an
employer or company has discriminated against an African-American, how
can it be the white person has suffered a "badge" or "incident" of slavery
sufficient to support congressional power? Such a construction would seem
to stretch the ability of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment
through "appropriate" legislation to its limits.
The constitutional implications present themselves in the 1969 case
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.93 In Sullivan, Paul Sullivan was the white
owner of a home and a rental property in a residential community in Virginia.
The residential community included a park and a playground operated by
a corporation in which the community members owned shares.' Sullivan
rented his property to an African-American named TR. Freeman, Jr.; and,
under the by-laws of the corporation, Sullivan was allowed to assign his
shares to the park and playground to Freeman subject to approval by the
corporation's board of directors. 95 The directors refused to approve the
assignment based on Freeman's race.' Sullivan objected to the board's
93 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
94 Id. at 234-35-
95 Id.
96 Id. at 235.
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decision and was expelled from the corporation as a consequence.97
Absent the argument that Sullivan is asserting some kind of third-party
standing of Freeman,98 it is difficult to see how Sullivan's expulsion from
the corporation was a type of injury that evinces a "badge" or "incident" of
slavery. It is, after all, the private discrimination against Freeman's race that
motivated the board's decision, not Sullivan's. However, if one understands
the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power as designed to break up
the power of racialized cartels, then the result seems far more sensible.
Congress's authority under section two empowers it to disrupt the creation
and maintenance of racialized cartels. Racialized cartels use internal private
norm enforcing mechanisms-like ostracism, expulsion, shame, etc.-to
enforce the cartels and to maintain social and economic status." Therefore,
Congress has authority under section two to disrupt racialized cartels by
arming defectors, like Sullivan, with a right of action against the cartel's
norm enforcers. 00
Second, it suggests that there is a constitutional backdrop beyond the
intentionality framework of Equal Protection that can serve as a source
of legislative authority by policy makers interested in the problems of
structural racism. Equal protection doctrine as it currently stands requires
some evidence of disparate treatment. The Court has yet to strike down
all legislation aimed at state-created disparate impacts on the grounds that
such legislation is not "congruent" or "proportional" to section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment, or is otherwise outside the scope of Congress'
authority,"' but the risk of invalidity is there. Further, the Court has edged
ever closer to finding that some laws enacted under Congress' commerce
power aimed at disparate impacts are themselves violations of Equal
Protection.102 If the Thirteenth Amendment is understood as empowering
Congress to prevent racialized cartels, it offers some hope that efforts to
regulate disparate impact may survive these challenges. At the very least,
the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to support legislation that
obliges policy makers to consider the impact that their decisions will have
97 Id.
98 This is a position that Justices Thomas and Scalia took in a much later case. See
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 467 (2oo8) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99 Cf. Leslie, supra note 33, at 1674 (discussing shunning as a type of cartel enforcing
mechanism).
ioo See Miller, A Thirteenth Amendment Agenda, supra note i, at 298 n. 18.
1o See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark. ex rel. May, 255 E3d 615, 625-27 (8th Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing whether Title VII as passed pursuant to § 5 authority is constitutional as it applies to
disparate impacts); see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736-39 (2003)
(applying a quasi-disparate impact analysis to determine the constitutionality of the Family
and Medical Leave Act).
102 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he war
between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves
us to begin thinking about how-and on what terms-to make peace between them.").
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on groups tied to a history of slavery. Congress already does this with
respect to regulation affecting economic interests; 13 it is not a stretch to
have the same considerations apply in the area of racial justice."
And finally, it is worth noting that the power of Congress under the
Thirteenth Amendment is not without its own set of problems and
temptations which must be respected and controlled. Not every form of
individual preference, whether aggregated or not, can be properly identified
as a "badge," an "incident," or a "relic" of slavery, nor should it. Nor does
the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment contains more specific authority
to stamp out racial inequality than, say, the Commerce Clause power mean
that the Thirteenth Amendment power supersedes all other protections
in the constitutional text. 105 What this argument about Thirteenth
Amendment power says is that, as Jack Balkin notes, the Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power is both broader and more structural than
the existing understandings will admit, and must be taken seriously, rather
than relegated to a state of constitutional desuetude. 116
CONCLUSION
This essay has attempted to pull tighter the threads that link theories
of structural racism, theories of cartel behavior, and theories of the
remedial powers of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment. But,
as the participants in this symposium are aware, further work remains.
Reconstruction is an inter-generational project, an "unfinished revolution,"
in the words of historian Eric Foner. The challenge of racial inequality in
the twenty-first century comes not from monstrous men of evil intent, but
from forgetfulness and comfortable complacency. We must be vigilant; we
must be diligent. For, despite its appearances, Reconstruction is a verb, not
a noun.
103 See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2oo6) (requiring federal agencies to prepare an impact study on
how a rule will affect small businesses and other small entities).
1O4 Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-103(a), 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 1 I, 1994) (requiring
agencies to identify "disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental ef-
fects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income popula-
tions"); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (b)-(c) (zoio) (addresing disparate impact in EPA funding).
105 See Balkin, supra note 64, at 1824 (noting that powers to enforce Reconstruction
Amendments are themselves subject to other constitutional limits).
io6 Seeid. at i8i&-I8.
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